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A Critique of Abelard's Essay on Universals December 13, 1994 From reflection upon the processes of abstraction that Abelard discussed in his essay on universals (primarily pp. 178-180), I came to wonder how the imagination would be perceived by Abelard and what he might think of imagined constructs that are not known sensually to exist. In order to explore these, one must relate them to Abelard's concept of universals as I shall do in that which follows. The process of abstraction allows us to contemplate a thing separately from the way it is found to exits. Abelard does not ask that we forget the tie that a concept be considered separately from the manner it exists in reality, instead, while realizing that the tie exists, abstraction allows us to consider the concept in a setting more simplistic that that which it naturally exists. A good analogy might be this. Bauxite, a clay-like mineral from which aluminum is obtained, is composed of several various elements including aluminum. In order to learn about the various properties that are inherent within aluminum it must first be extracted from the bauxite ore into a pure from which is not found anywhere in nature existing in that state. In the extracted (for thought- abstracted) form one is able to learn much more about this thing which is a part of bauxite and also come to understand more about the reasons for bauxite being the way it is. In this same manner we may come to understand a thing better - both in and of itself, and in the way it actually exists by means of the process of abstraction. For Abelard, abstraction requires an existing thing from which a quality may be taken into an artificial mental context in which it may be considered and studied. In this manner a concept is able to be formed, one which may then be thought of as free from ties with existence (although the ties exist), it is no longer a sensory thing. The freedom of the concept allows it to interact with other abstracted concepts to form new constructs that are not found to exist. I believe that Abelard would at this point accept this definition of imagination: imagination is the process by which abstracted concepts may interact in new and unique ways not necessarily existing in that way. An imagined construct would be any new concept representative of a combination of abstracted concepts. (From this point forward the word, concept, will stand in place of abstracted concepts except as may be noted in other contexts.) At this point we know little more than it is possible to create constructs that may or may not exist in reality by a process of imagination. Such concepts are universals only when they "signify the inner substance of something which is sensibly by reason of its external forms." (p180-181) From this, the concept of magicality would not be a universal because, although it might be conceived by combining concepts of power, order, and chaos etc., this new construct would not describe any substance sensible by being sensual. That is to say sensible things rely upon the senses (or an augmentation of these) to provide a framework from which they may be abstracted. Because there is no evidence that magic exists as a quality of any object, there are no facts (sensual things) that would support this interpretation. Magic is not a sensible thing nor is it an universal. Abelard requires that a universal represent an enduring substrate which lies beneath a sensible. The only fashion in which a universal might be regarded as not sensible is upon realization that the universal is a form of the substrate viewed in a manner in which it does not exist. Therefore imagined constructs may not be universals alone because they utilize things that may be said to be universals of existing things. The constructs however cannot stand alone as a single entity conceptually as can universals abstracted from existing things. Nothing more that is new may be abstracted from the construct. If we may take concepts capable of bearing the title of universals as Abelard defines them, for example the universals of pure good, pure rationality, pure comprehension, and pure power to form a construct I will call God. These are all things which may be abstracted from external sensual and sensible forms. The divine mind is not a sensible thing although universals signify qualities of it according to Priscian whom Abelard agrees with. God or a divine mind is not a sensible thing because it is composed of universals considered in a way they are not found, so concepts of the good, the rational, power, etc. cannot be derived from the divine mind which exist only in the understanding inasmuch as we do not perceive it sensually. God is not the source of knowledge of these things. However, God is commonly conceived of as being a first cause or source for all things so therefore all that is sensible and in existence comes from God. Now it would appear to follow inherently that an all perfect, all good, etc. construct of these universals cannot also contain universals in direct opposition to them such as irrationality, evil, etc. As a first cause, the divine mind would have to be able to abstract from the universals of which it is composed those and only those universals which may be found in it in order to construct a new ordering of these universals which in its pure power it is able to cause to exist. It would appear to directly follow that any construct of the divine mind could not include any of the anti-divine mind universals because God could not possibly abstract these things from himself. (For the sake of the arg. please ignore the paradox of omnipotence) We know from experience and observation of objects in existence that these anti-divine universals may indeed be abstracted from objects in existence. We can conceive of pure irrationality, pure evil, pure ignorance etc. which should not be possible if God is a first cause. Therefore, if one accepts Abelard's understanding of universals as correct, one cannot also hold that the common conception of believers in God as first cause is also true. In this essay I have attempted to show my understanding of Abelard's arguments for universals by trying to understand the process by which universals may come into the understanding- namely Abelard's process of abstraction as I have tied it to the imagination process and its constructs. References Baird, Forrest E., Ed. and Walter Kaufmann. Medieval Philosophy. Engelwood Cliffs:Prentice Hall Inc, 1994. Brooke
D. Peterson-Burch.
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